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Abstract 
 
This paper analyzes the optimal level of transfer pricing manipulation when the expected 
tax penalty is a function of the tax enforcement and the market price parameter. The arm’s 
length principle implies the existence of a range of acceptable prices shaped by market, 
and firms can manipulate transfer prices more freely if market price range is wide, or if 
its delimitations are difficult to determine. Home taxation of foreign profits can reduce 
income shifting incentive, depending on the portion of repatriation for tax purposes. We 
find that the limited tax credit rule tends to be a less efficient measure, nonetheless it is 
the most widely adopted rule by countries, so to spark the perspective of more powerful 
approaches for taxation of foreign profits. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Tax administrators from major economies unveil increasing concerns about 
international income shifting activities of multinational enterprises (MNE), as a strategy 
to reduce their global taxation. The strategy consists in transferring profits from high-tax 
locations to low-tax locations, so to subject a greater fraction of total profits to lower tax 
rates. Evidences indicate that income shifting is a worldwide persistent practice in several 
economic sectors (Devereux & Maffini, 2007; Borkowski, 1996; Hines, 1996) and the 
manipulation of prices in intra-firm transactions is a disseminated scheme to achieve it 
(Clausing (2003) and Swenson (2001) provide substantial evidences). In response to this 
tax avoidance conduct, tax authorities impose the adoption of law-enforced specific 
conditions for prices of internal transactions, and implement procedures to prevent 
outflows of profits or to reduce its effect on domestic tax base. 
In intra-firm transactions, the top requirement is the application of the arm’s 
length principle for the determination of transfer prices, in order to reflect the prices 
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settled in conditions of commercial and financial independence. Despite formal 
imposition of this requirement, its effectiveness highly depends on stringency of tax 
authorities, regarding both the means to confirm the application of the principle and the 
acceptance of proofs prepared by MNE to sustain pricing choices (Lohse et al, 2012). In 
particular, arm’s length condition involves significant complexity to tax auditors because 
it is a market-based criterion, so they necessarily rely on observable pricing information 
in external transactions for the assessment of transfer pricing appropriateness. 
A second relevant mechanism against income shifting is the taxation of foreign 
profits by MNE’s residence country: this is included in the controlled foreign company 
(CFC) rules. In this system, home country demands the taxation of profits earned abroad 
when they are transferred to the headquarter division, and establishes a type of 
compensation structure to avoid multiple taxation on the same profit. CFC rules typically 
carry clauses and provisions to regulate maintenance of profits in host country, aiming to 
inhibit abuse of repatriation deferral, and it commonly results in compulsory repatriation 
of a portion of foreign profits for tax purposes. In this case, even if taxable profits are 
transferred to distinct jurisdictions, MNE’s home country is able to recover tax revenues 
through repatriation. This is a binding case if MNE’s home country has a higher tax rate 
and suffers from outflow of profits, but it poses as an inefficient measure if profits are 
shifted away from host countries with high tax rates1. Hence, home taxation of foreign 
profits can influence transfer pricing manipulation, and the impact of distinct CFC rules 
are specially important for the optimal transfer price. 
This study proceeds with further analysis of the transfer pricing manipulation 
when MNE is subjected to tax penalization if mispricing is detected. Tax penalty refers 
to an additional cost with some probability for its incurrence, and this expectation is 
associated with the level of tax enforcement exercised in the assessment of the transfer 
prices. We propose the segregation of endogenous and exogenous components of 
penalization probability, with respect to MNE, so to segregate the influence of countries’ 
tax enforcement and of MNE’s transfer pricing choice on the expected tax penalty cost. 
We then present a specification of the endogenous probability that aims to approximate 
the realistic relation between transfer prices and the arm’s length parameter in a plain and 
comprehensible configuration2. The resulting model allows to demonstrate that the tax 
enforcement, denoting the exogenous probability and the tax fine, is negatively related 
with the optimal level of transfer pricing manipulation. As a main analysis from the 
model, application of arm’s length principle suggests that the transfer price that stirs the 
tax penalty is not a discrete figure, but it depends on the range of acceptable values that 
are delineated by market participants. The delimitations of the accepted price range may 
be more or less observable, creating a critical difficulty for the evaluation of intra-firm 
prices by tax authorities. The model is applied to examine the effect of different rules of 
foreign profit taxation. In general, analysis indicates that income shifting incentive is not 
completely neutralized if there is a chance for MNE to manage the repatriation of foreign 
profits, and the limited tax credit rule, which is the one most widely adopted by countries 
(Hines, 2008; Schjelderup, 1999), appears to be not fully efficient in discouraging transfer 
pricing manipulation. The proportional tax credit rule may act as a more efficient 
alternative for discouraging income shifting and recovering tax revenues for home 
countries. 
                                                          
1
 Location of MNE’s headquarter plays a relevant role in income shifting practices, for it can attract more 
profits even if it is not the most tax advantageous option (Dischinger et al, 2013). 
2
 Existing studies limit the breakdown of the tax penalty function into factors scaling for the concealment 
cost, and fewer ones explicitly consider the penalization probability. To the best of our knowledge, the 
influence of arm’s length range on the analysis of the expected tax penalty cost is still lacking. 
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Our analysis have potential implications for the current international discussion 
on the improvement of anti-shifting mechanisms and the issues regarding the application 
of arm’s length principle on tax assessment of contemporaneous business. The 
Organization for the Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) recognizes that 
MNE have been able to misapply current transfer pricing rules in order to allocate taxable 
profits to low-tax jurisdictions. Specifically, the prevailing arm’s length system exhibits 
limitations when employed to the valuation of transactions with higher risks, and new 
developments on the application of arm’s length principle are required to solve these 
obstacles (OECD, 2013). OECD highlights the impact of efficient CFC rules in context 
of transfer pricing manipulation, claiming that the strengthening of these rules can 
neutralize undue benefits from long-term deferral and reduce income shifting incentive. 
Although other alternatives for international income allocation have been proposed, 
OECD sustains its position to maintain the arm’s length principle as the fundamental basis 
of the guidelines, to resolve the flaws in existing transfer pricing rules, and to enhance 
the design of existing CFC rules. In this line, our analysis aims to refine the understanding 
of the influence of the arm’s length principle on transfer pricing choice, and to expose the 
outcomes of distinct rules of foreign profit taxation. 
This study also contributes to recent researches that emphasize the influence of 
tax enforcement and tax regulations against income shifting. Literature sustains that 
income shifting implies concealment costs (Buettner et al, 2011; Haufler & Schjelderup, 
2000), which reflect both the risk of supplementary tax and penalty payments for price 
manipulation, and MNE’s extra efforts to justify the economic motivations of intra-firm 
transactions and to eventually hide opportunistic behavior in transfer pricing choice3. 
While the latter type is associated with transaction costs and harbor expenses incurred by 
the MNE, the effect of transfer pricing manipulation tends to have a chief role within the 
expected tax penalty cost of the former type4, which is in the spot of this study. The 
probability of tax penalization is closely associated with the level of tax enforcement and 
anti-shifting legislation in each country, and recent studies find that these measures are 
efficient in preventing income shifting. Beer and Loeprick (2015), Beuselink et al (2014) 
and Lohse and Riedel (2013) obtain significant findings demonstrating that rigid transfer 
pricing rules reduce income shifting, and specific tax fines can exert additional 
enforcement towards tax compliance5. Results indicate, however, that transfer pricing 
regulation is not effective to control transmissions of intangibles (Beer & Loeprick, 
2015), and this may be linked with the issues attributed to the application of current arm’s 
length system to valuation of these transactions. Regarding CFC rules, Markle (2011) 
find that firms subjected to tax exemption of foreign profits shift more income from high-
tax to low-tax locations, in comparison to firms that are imposed to residence-based 
taxation, and Egger and Wamser (2015) indicate that CFC rules bear ponderous costs for 
firms and restrain real investment abroad, thus limiting the opportunities for income 
shifting. 
                                                          
3
 Hines and Rice (1994) consider extended concealment costs, related with inefficiencies in internal 
transactions and additional investments to make pricing choices seem plausible. These costs appears to be 
particularly relevant if income shifting involves simulations and multiple-stage transactions, mainly by 
manipulation of transacted quantities. 
4
 Evidence indicates that stronger signs of transfer pricing manipulation are associated with both higher 
level of audit activity and with higher returns generated from tax audits. See Alm (2012) for a survey on 
controlling tax evasion. 
5
 Results indicate that, depending on the inferential model, tight transfer pricing rules can reduce income 
shifting by 50%. 
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The outline of this study is organized as follows: Section 2 structures the basic 
model for the benchmark case of tax exemption of foreign profits6, including the expected 
tax penalty cost. We construct the specification of the endogenous component of tax 
penalty probability and derive the optimal level of transfer pricing manipulation affected 
by tax enforcement and arm’s length parameter. In Sections 3-6, we analyze the effect of 
three rules of foreign profit taxation on the optimal transfer pricing manipulation. Section 
7 extends the analysis for the impact of ad valorem tariffs on imports, and Section 8 
concludes. 
 
2. The model 
 
Consider a MNE with two divisions, the parent company located in Country 1 and 
a wholly owned subsidiary located in Country 2 (i = 1,2). Both divisions produce outputs 
xi, with costs Ci(xi), bringing revenues Ri(si). Parent firm also exports part of its output 
(m) to subsidiary in Country 2, charging a transfer price p. The pretax profits of both 
divisions are 
 
1 1 1 1 1( ) ( )R s C s m pmπ = − + +     and   2 2 2 2 2( ) ( )R s C s m pmπ = − − −  
 
For an income tax rate ti in each country, application of source principle on 
taxation of foreign profits leads to MNE’s global net profit 
 
1 1 2 2(1 ) (1 )t tπ πΠ = − + −    (1) 
 
Income shifting incentive arises when t1 ≠ t2, so MNE maximizes Π when greater 
portions of profits are transferred from high-tax to low-tax country, via manipulation of 
p. In Equation (1), we see that, if t2 > t1, Πp > 0
7, and we call the high transfer price – HTP 
case; if t2 < t1, Πp < 0, and we call the low transfer price – LTP case
8. 
In order to discourage transfer pricing manipulation, both countries settle their 
own non-negligible and non-deductible tax penalty Zi, charged if the difference between 
p and a parameter price (assume an arm’s length price p) causes profits to be shifted away. 
Based on the determinants sustained in literature (Lohse & Riedel, 2013; Haufler & 
Schjelderup, 2000; Kant, 1988), we assume the incurrence of Zi depends on two main 
factors: the extent of transfer pricing manipulation and the level of country’s tax 
enforcement. 
First, probability of imposition of penalty Zi depends on the magnitude of the 
difference p – p: a greater deviation from parameter p is more likely to be interpreted as 
tax evasion by fiscal authorities, and presents less defense chances in court. This factor is 
referred as probability α. Second, stricter transfer pricing regulation and more rigorous 
tax audits represent higher probability of penalization. The influence of countries’ 
enforcement activity is referred as probability φi. Thus, there are four outcomes derived 
from probabilities α and φi (Table 1). When MNE manipulates p, there is some probability 
φi that the harmed country i detects mispricing, so Zi is inflicted. Indeed, there is 
                                                          
6
 This is the benchmark case, with no taxation of foreign profits. Source-based taxation stands for the case 
of tax exemption of foreign profits. 
7
 (Double) subscripts denote first (second) derivatives with respect to indicated variables. 
8
 These simple conditions suffer modifications when additional factors are introduced in the analysis. We 
examine the more complex cases of residence principle taxation and the impact of ad valorem tariffs on 
imports in subsequent sections of this study, where HTP and LTP cases modify. 
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probability 1 – φi that transfer pricing manipulation is unnoticed, implying no 
penalization. Further, when MNE does not manipulate p, complemental probability 1 – α 
results in no tax penalty, regardless the level of tax enforcement. 
 
Table 1: Outcomes from probabilities α and φi 
 
  Country’s penalty imposition 
  φi 1 – φi 
Firm’s 
penalty 
exposure 
α αφiZi α(1 – φi)0 
1 – α (1 – α)φi0 (1 – α)(1 – φi)0 
 
For a penalty Zi(m) = zim, zi > 0, unitary on the volume of intra-firm trade, the 
expected tax penalty due to transfer pricing manipulation is 
 
( )i i iE Z z mαϕ=    (2) 
 
For the analysis, we relate to the probability components α and φi as the following: 
 
Definition 1: The expected tax penalty of transfer pricing manipulation as in Equation (2) 
is composed by two probability components: component α is the endogenous probability 
and component φi is the exogenous probability, with respect to MNE. 
 
In effect, probability α is endogenous because it reflects the impact of 
managements’ transfer pricing decisions over the expected tax penalty, i.e. MNE is able 
to influence E(Zi) since changes in p cause changes in α. On the other hand, probability 
φi is exogenous because it characterizes governments’ exercise to detect and punish 
income shifting, which suffers no influence from MNE’s decisions. Although tax rules 
require the application of arm’s length principle, countries’ actions related with enforcing 
audit procedures and strengthening fiscal interpretation of what is an acceptable transfer 
price cannot themselves change the market-based parameter p; so, tax authorities are 
either not able to influence α. Thus, because of these properties, components α and φi are 
assumed to be independent9. 
MNE faces additional cost of the expected penalty and focuses in maximizing the 
objective function ϕ = Π – E(Zi)
10. For a tax enforcement φi > 0, manipulation of p implies 
E(Zi)p > 0, while ϕE(Zi) < 0. Therefore, profit maximization occurs when MNE achieves 
equilibrium between reducing global income tax and increasing expected tax penalty. 
 
2.1 Specification of endogenous probability α and optimal level of transfer pricing 
manipulation 
 
To design a reasonable specification for φi is a rather complex task, because the 
estimation of degrees of tax enforcement relies upon government-level factors that are 
                                                          
9
 The assumption reflects the economic concept of price-taker for governments. This is consistent with the 
arm’s length system in OECD guidance. 
10
 i = 2 for HTP case, and i = 1 for LTP case. 
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difficult to observe and measure11. Besides the existence of specific tax rules, exogenous 
probability φi depends on governments’ mechanisms to guarantee proper application of 
these rules, which are associated mainly with audit strategies, the effectiveness of fiscal 
monitoring and the characteristics of legal system. 
Diversely, specification of α appears to be a more straightforward matter. 
Literature on tax regulation assumes the standard model as a twice-differentiable function 
f(p – p), satisfying f(p = p) = 0, sign fp = sign (p – p) and fpp > 0 (Buettner et al, 2011; 
Haufler & Schjelderup, 2000; Kant, 1988); i.e. in our model, standard conditions are 
internalized in α. With respect to parameter price p, independent negotiations in open 
market usually generate a range of market prices, all of which represent the prices 
obtained in transactions under arm’s length conditions (OECD, 2010). It comprises the 
accepted variance of p due to market forces, so any p within this range is considered an 
appropriate market price in some degree. In this study, we follow the concept of arm’s 
length conditions stated in OECD guidance12. 
Assume a market price range pmin < p < pmax, where pmin > 0, so p is the central 
parameter13. pmin and pmax are bottom and top limits of market price range, respectively, 
and are outlined by (presumably tacit) consensus of market players. In this way, pmax (pmin) 
is the limiting price which triggers tax penalty with certainty for HTP (LTP) case (Kant, 
1988)14, i.e. α increases as p gets closer to pc (c = min, max). Inversely, there is no tax 
penalty if p is settled at or below (above) p in HTP (LTP) case. Therefore, endogenous 
probability α can be specified as 
 
( )
( )
r
c r
p p
p p
α
−
=
−
 , for c = min, max   (3) 
 
where r is the curve’s slope. From Equation (3), we set: 
 
• for HTP, c = max; 
    0 1
               0
           1
max
max
p p p
p p
p p
α
α
α
 < < → < <

≥ → =
 ≥ → =
 
 
• for LTP, c = min; 
    0 1
               0
           1
min
min
p p p
p p
p p
α
α
α
 < < → < <

≤ → =
 ≤ → =
 
 
                                                          
11
 Some studies create measures of legal enforcement and stringency based on rules characteristics, e.g. 
Lohse et al., 2012. 
12
 Note that the arm’s length principle does not require an existing active market for the objects of the 
transaction. It states that the arm’s length price is the price binding the conditions an open market would 
demand, in normal operation. While there may be genuine difficulty in determining the appropriate transfer 
price in absence of market forces, the principle has become sufficiently familiar to allow a common 
understanding among governments and firms (OECD, 2010), so they are still capable to find a consensus 
of an accepted arm’s length range. The range’s delimitations may be more or less blurred, depending on 
the observable information used to reach consensus. 
13
 p can be interpreted as the closest figure to some ideally accurate arm’s length price. Here, it can be 
assigned as the mean price. 
14
 HTP case refers to p – p > 0; LTP case refers to p – p < 0. 
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Equation (3) satisfies standard conditions15 for all r > 1. It models the endogenous 
probability α by mirroring the relation between transfer price p and price parameters 
shaped by market, thus α depends on deviation of p from p, with respect to market 
parameter pc – p. 
The optimal level of transfer pricing manipulation can be analyzed differentiating 
the objective function ϕ with respect to p, using α as specified in Equation (3). Assuming 
r = 2 for simplification, we obtain 
 
2 1 2
( ) 2 0
( )
p i ic
p p
t t m z m
p p
φ ϕ
−
= − − =
−
   (4) 
 
Clearly, the level of transfer pricing manipulation is expressed by the term p – p. 
Solving Equation (4) for p – p leads to 
 
2
2 1 ( )
2
c
i i
t t p p
p p
zϕ
− −
− =    (5) 
 
Equation (5) provides interesting understanding on factors influencing firms’ 
motivations to shift profits among countries when they are subjected to possible tax 
penalization (details in Appendix A). Initially, tax differential t2 – t1 preserves the 
position of prime incentive for income shifting, as raised by seminal work of Horst 
(1971). The magnitude of tax differential essentially computes for the extent of transfer 
pricing manipulation, and its sign determines the direction of transfers. 
Moreover, denominator φizi on right hand of Equation (5) accounts for conjoint 
factors of tax penalization in case that mispricing is detected. Increase of either exogenous 
probability φi or tax penalty zi reduces the weight of tax differential, so the optimal level 
of transfer pricing manipulation is reduced. Countries are able to enforce tax actions in 
order to discourage income shifting. Larger fines produce larger potential costs when 
misbehavior is identified, and MNE becomes exposed to bigger losses. Besides that, 
governments can increase tax enforcement through specific tax rules, while auditors can 
toughen tax inspections and improve efficiency of tax controls, leading to a greater 
probability of imposition of tax penalty. Even if unitary penalty zi is not changed, an 
increase of exogenous probability φi causes optimal p to get closer to p, i.e. increase in φi 
weaken the impact of tax differential, so MNE is forced to reduce the distance between p 
and p in order to restore equilibrium. 
Equation (5) also shows that the optimal level of transfer pricing manipulation is 
influenced by pc – p. A wide range of market prices provides a whole set of alternatives 
for MNE to choose a transfer price in accordance with arm’s length criteria. Formally, 
expanding the range between pc and p causes an increase in the level of transfer pricing 
manipulation because it allows MNE to enlarge the distance between p and p and still be 
tax compliant. Any p within price parameter pc – p satisfies arm’s length condition 
required by tax authorities, so MNE is able to justify its choice against questionings and 
prosecutions whether p does not hit pc, and this can be specially beneficial for MNE if pc 
is hard to delimit. 
In what follows, we analyze transfer pricing manipulation when foreign profits 
are subjected to residence-based taxation rules in home country. First, we consider the 
case when home country allows tax credits for foreign taxes paid abroad, those credits 
                                                          
15
 Equation (3) applies for the instance fpp < 0, e.g. 0 < r < 1. 
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being limited by the proportion of the amount of foreign profits repatriated by MNE: this 
is the proportional tax credit rule. The second case is when tax credits are allowed in home 
country, but are limited to the home taxation of foreign profits: this is the limited tax 
credit rule. In sequence, we analyze the third case when foreign taxes are treated as 
deductible costs in home country: this is the foreign tax deduction rule. Finally, a 
summary comparison is shown, and the impact of ad valorem tariffs on imports is 
pondered. 
 
3. Proportional tax credit rule and transfer pricing manipulation 
 
Assume Country 1 demands domestic taxation of foreign profits at the moment 
they are repatriated, and applies proportional tax credit rule on recoverable foreign taxes. 
Assume also that MNE is allowed to defer repatriation of foreign profits, and some 
amount of profits earned by subsidiary may remain16 in Country 2. Let the rate of 
repatriation be b, where 0 ≤ b ≤ 1. Given t1 ≠ t2, MNE has incentive to manage b in order 
to reduce global taxation, depending on which tax rate is higher. 
For the HTP case, t2 > t1 implies that tax credit is equal to home taxation of foreign 
profits t1bπ2, because MNE is not allowed to use taxes paid in Country 2 to offset income 
tax17 in Country 1. This ultimate restriction gives 
 
1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )t t t b t b t tπ π π π π πΠ = − + − − + = − + −    (6) 
 
so global net income and the level of transfer pricing manipulation are not influenced by 
b (Schjelderup, 1999; Kant, 1988). 
For the LTP case, global net profits are 
 
1 1 2 2 1 2 2 2(1 ) (1 )t t t b t bπ π π πΠ = − + − − +    (7) 
 
Substituting Equation (7) in objective function ϕ and proceeding with same steps 
up to Equation (5) result in 
 
2 2
2 1 2 1
(1 ) (1 ) ( )(1 )( ) ( )
2 2
c c
i i i i
t b t b t t bp p p p
p p
z zϕ ϕ
− − − − −− −
− = =    (8) 
 
Comparing Equation (8) with Equation (5), we find that both equations present 
the same characteristics regarding the influence of tax enforcement and of market price 
parameter over the income shifting incentive. We find in Equation (8), though, that b is 
negatively related with the level of transfer pricing manipulation, so that the repatriation 
of foreign profits reduces mispricing incentive by proportion b. We can state: 
 
Proposition 1: For LTP case, proportional tax credit rule reduces the optimal level of 
transfer pricing manipulation by the proportion of the repatriation rate b. 
 
Proof: See Appendix B. □ 
                                                          
16
 A number of countries allows the deferral of repatriation of foreign profits, e.g. United States (Internal 
Revenue Code – IRC, Subpart F, §§951-965), Germany (Außenstteuergesetz – AStG, §§7-14), and United 
Kingdom (Taxation (International and Other Provisions) Act 2010 – TIOPA, Part 9A). 
17
 Any b > 0 makes the limit t1bπ2 ≥ t2bπ2 is inconsistent with HTP case. 
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If foreign profits are retained in Country 2 they are taxed only by rate t2, so MNE 
has incentive to choose b = 0. On the opposite stand, home country is inclined to require 
the repatriation of greater portion of foreign profits in order to counteract the impact of 
transfer pricing manipulation18, i.e. mandatory repatriation brings shifted profits back for 
taxation at home country. 
 
4. Limited tax credit rule and transfer pricing manipulation 
 
Assume the circumstances stated in previous section, but now home country 
applies the limited tax credit rule. Here again, MNE has incentive to manage b whether 
t1 ≠ t2. MNE can use full tax credits, but faces the limitation t1bπ2 ≥ t2qπ2, where q is the 
rate of tax credit granted by Country 1, so 0 ≤ q ≤ 1. 
For both HTP and LTP cases, global net profits are 
 
1 1 2 2 1 2 2 2(1 ) (1 )t t t b t qπ π π πΠ = − + − − +    (9) 
 
formally subjected to inequality constraint t1bπ2 ≥ t2qπ2. Solving ϕp for p – p, with net 
profits in Equation (9), we get 
 
2
2 1
(1 ) (1 ) ( )
2
c
i i
t q t b p p
p p
zϕ
− − − −
− =    (10) 
 
for which previous properties regarding tax enforcement and market price parameter 
remain. Initially, if q = b, Equation (10) becomes identical to Equation (8), thus MNE has 
incentive to set a higher q, so greater tax credits are recovered. Indeed, MNE is able to 
offset home taxation of foreign profits if there is ability to manage b within 0 ≤ b ≤ t2/t1, 
and additional taxation is incurred when b > t2/t1 occurs
19. We arrive at the following: 
 
Proposition 2: Limited tax credit rule reduces the optimal level of transfer pricing 
manipulation if b > t2/t1. 
 
Proof: See Appendix C. □ 
 
From Proposition 2, we can state: 
 
Corollary 1: For t2 > t1, limited tax credit rule implies q < b, hence t1bπ2 is completely 
offset by t2qπ2. 
 
Here, Corollary 1 refers to HTP case. When maximizing condition b = q(t2/t1) is 
satisfied, MNE neutralizes the effect of repatriation, and optimal level of transfer pricing 
manipulation assumes structure of Equation (5). It indicates that, if governments allow 
MNE to defer repatriation of a fraction of foreign profits, limited tax credit rule is not 
fully efficient in discouraging income shifting. The trigger for LTP case is when the rate 
of mandatory repatriation is high enough so taxation of π2 by home country becomes 
greater than income tax in host country. 
                                                          
18
 If b = 1, Equation (8) becomes p – p = 0. Thus, full repatriation neutralizes the incentive to manipulate 
transfer prices. 
19
 Maximization condition b = q(t2/t1), for limiting situation with maximum tax credit rate, q = 1. 
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5. Foreign tax deduction rule and transfer pricing manipulation 
 
Assume the conditions from previous sections, with the difference that home 
country imposes the foreign tax deduction rule on repatriated foreign profits. MNE’s 
global net income takes the form 
 
1 1 2 2 1 2 2 2(1 ) (1 ) ( )t t t b tπ π π πΠ = − + − − −    (11) 
 
The optimal level of transfer pricing manipulation becomes 
 
2
2 1 1
(1 ) (1 ) ( )
2
c
i i
t t b t b p p
p p
zϕ
− − − −
− =    (12) 
 
Impacts of tax enforcement and of market price parameter remain. Foreign tax 
deduction rule brings a novel instance regarding maximization of global net income, 
because it can generate an overall taxation greater than t1(π1 + π2), e.g. full repatriation 
implies Π = (1 – t1)(π1 + π2) – t2(π2 – t1π2), so Equation (12) renders p – p ≠ 0 if b = 1. 
Even if t2 = t1, MNE still has incentive to manipulate transfer prices, depending on the 
magnitude of repatriation rate. In fact, we observe that (p – p)b > 0 because an increase in 
b causes optimal p to increase (decrease in b causes the opposite). We can state: 
 
Proposition 3: In foreign tax deduction rule, optimal transfer price p is positively related 
with repatriation rate b. 
 
Proof: See Appendix D. □ 
 
Therefore, repatriation of foreign profits is capable of discouraging income 
shifting only in LTP case, because p – p is already positive in HTP case. In detail, 
Proposition 3 derives: 
 
Corollary 2: For t2 < t1, foreign tax deduction rule neutralizes the optimal level of transfer 
pricing manipulation (optimal p – p is zero) if b = (t1 – t2)/[t1(1 – t2)]. 
 
MNE can face the particular situation where optimal p – p is positive (HTP case) 
while t2 < t1, i.e. for a sufficiently large b, higher p can increase global net income, 
although home country levies the superior tax rate. In effect, MNE incurs in additional 
taxation t1bπ2 but recovers only t1t2bπ2; thus, total tax burden on foreign profits can be 
greater than one on domestic profits, and MNE would be in better position if both 
divisions were located in Country 1. Ultimately, maximization of global net income 
occurs when MNE has the alternative to retain π2 completely in host country. 
 
6. Summary comparison of foreign profit taxation rules 
 
Comparing Equations (8), (10) and (12), we see that their differences rely on the 
recoverable portion of taxation in host country. For LTP case binding all three rules, 
comparison demonstrates that 
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1
1
2
1 (1 ) (1 )
t
b b t b
t
 
− < − < − 
 
   (13) 
 
The term 1 – b(t1/t2) on the first left is the t2-offset impact for the limited tax credit 
rule: it causes the smallest change in the optimal level of transfer pricing manipulation, 
specially when tax differential is large, because this rule allows the recovery of a higher 
credit based on taxes paid in Country 2. On the opposite right of Equation (13), 1 – t1b is 
the effect of the foreign tax deduction rule: repatriation under this rule produces a greater 
effect on optimal p – p. This is due to the characteristics of double taxation arising from 
limiting compensation of foreign taxation up to t1t2bπ2. The intermediate term 1 – b comes 
from the proportional tax credit rule: it illustrates the outcome stated in Proposition 1. 
Equation (13) demonstrates in a clearer way that the influence of the proportional tax 
credit rule on income shifting incentive does not depend on tax rates of each country. This 
can be an attractive aspect for tax administrators, since the rule’s applicability becomes 
plain for all locations, and the expected consequences on income shifting might become 
reasonably simpler to foresee. 
 
7. Impact of tariffs on imports20 
 
While home country may use the residence principle on taxation of foreign profits 
as an attempt to recover evaded tax revenues, host country has the alternative to impose 
ad valorem tariffs on imports (τ), so the additional taxation on intra-firm transactions may 
discourage income shifting. As a consequence, t2 = t1 is not sufficient to annul optimal p 
– p. See that 
 
2 1
21
t t
t
τ
−
=
−
   (14) 
 
is the regular requirement to thoroughly cancel the incentive to manipulate transfer prices 
(Eden, 1983; Itagaki, 1982; Samuelson, 1982). It stands when home country applies the 
tax exemption rule on foreign profits21: if relative tax differential (t2 – t1)/(1 – t2) is higher 
than tariff τ, maximization occurs at HTP case; if τ dominates, LTP is the maximization 
case. 
When home country applies the proportional tax credit rule, imposition of τ 
shortens the impact of repatriation rate b. Mispricing incentive still reduces, but it occurs 
by less than proportion b itself, so Proposition 1 is dropped. 
Regarding the limited tax credit rule, tariff τ affects both sides of restriction t1bπ2 
≥ t2qπ2. It shows that MNE maximizes global net income when b = q(t2/t1), which 
corresponds to the same conclusion obtained in the analysis of Equation (10). Thence, 
Proposition 2 and Corollary 1 hold in presence of tariff on imports. 
In analysis of the foreign tax deduction rule, our conclusion is the same as one 
previously presented: we have (p – p)b > 0 following from pb > 0, so Proposition 3 still 
applies. In addition, we find that, if τ is high enough, LTP case can become the 
maximization solution (even when t2 > t1). Tariff τ modifies necessary condition of b to 
neutralize income shifting incentive, and it turns Corollary 2 consistent for both HTP and 
LTP cases. Corollary 2 is extended to account for the effect of τ: 
                                                          
20
 Detailed analysis for this section in Appendix E. 
21
 Condition in Equation (14) is altered if home country applies residence-based taxation on foreign profits. 
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Corollary 2 – extended: Foreign tax deduction rule neutralizes the optimal level of 
transfer pricing manipulation (optimal p – p is zero) if b = [t1 – t2(1 + τ) + τ]/[t1(1 + τ)(1 
– t2)]. 
 
Comparing the impact of all three residence-based rules for taxation of π2, we 
obtain the same inequality expressed in Equation (13)22. In general, MNE’s responses to 
the rules of foreign profit taxation are essentially the same as for the absence of τ, but in 
different magnitude. Taxation in Country 2 becomes a function of both t2 and τ, so it 
affects the amount of optimal level of transfer pricing manipulation and the weight of 
repatriation effect, still the result of changing from one rule to another is the same. 
 
8. Conclusions 
 
This paper examines the optimal level of transfer pricing manipulation, taking into 
account certain probability of tax penalization by the impaired country. The endogenous 
probability function proposed in this study is useful to derive a fair structure for the factors 
influencing income shifting, and we apply this model to analyze the effects of foreign 
profit taxation rules. The analysis indicates that home taxation of foreign profits can 
reduce mispricing incentive, but the effect depends specially on the amount of 
compulsory repatriation. In spite of the broad application, the limited tax credit rule tends 
to be a less efficient alternative, in comparison to the other residence-based rules 
analyzed. Interesting result is that foreign tax deduction rule may actually induce income 
shifting if mandatory repatriation rate is superlative. Ad valorem tariffs on imports reduce 
manipulation mainly at the expense of the firm, yet repatriation effect on recovered tax 
revenues by home country may be materially attenuated for large taxation in host country. 
Our model provides a credible configuration for the influences of tax enforcement 
and market parameters on the transfer pricing choice, and can be applied to analyze these 
factors on other anti-shifting mechanisms. The model is consistent with the generally 
accepted role of tax enforcement to discourage manipulation. Besides, it incorporates the 
influence of the arm’s length range, showing that this effect is likewise significant for the 
evaluation of transfer pricing appropriateness. The findings suggest that governments 
may face a hard time challenging transfer prices if market values presents high volatility 
or if market activity does not allow to accurately observe delimitations of the accepted 
price range, so firms may benefit from it. The influence of changes in the arm’s length 
parameters is potentially relevant for studies on legislation efficiency and tax audits, and 
it appears to be a path for further investigation. 
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Appendix A: Analysis of optimal level of transfer pricing manipulation 
 
Assume the benchmark case with simplifications Gi = φizi and P = p
c – p for tax 
enforcement23 and price range variables, respectively. After the optimal level of transfer 
pricing manipulation derived from ϕp, differential with respect to tax enforcement Gi 
gives 
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which is negative for all r > 1, for both HTP and LTP cases24. If α = 1 (p ≥ pmax in HTP 
case; p ≤ pmin in LTP case), E(Zi) is not a function of p. In any case, we find that ϕGi = – 
E(Zi)Gi < 0. 
Differentiating p – p with respect to price range P yields 
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which is positive for all r > 1, for both HTP and LTP cases. Even if changes in price range 
are due to changes in p, we still have (p – p)P > 0 because (t2 – t1)P > 0 (and semi-elasticity 
r/(r – 1) > 1). 
 
Appendix B: Effect of repatriation under proportional tax credit rule for LTP case 
 
Differentiating Equation (8) with respect to b provides 
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2 1 ( )( )
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t t p p
p p
zϕ
− −
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which is matching with Equation (5), although is negative. It denotes that any increase 
(decrease) in b causes a decrease (increases) in level of income shifting by the proportion 
b itself, thus MNE maximizes global profits choosing the lowest possible repatriation 
rate. Derivative of Equation (7) with respect to b is Πb = t2π2 – t1π2. The repatriation rate 
that maximizes global net income is the one that equates taxation of π2 in both countries; 
thus, maximization occurs when b = 0. Note that LTP case implies p – p < 0. However, if 
b > 0 we have (p – p)b > 0, which neutralizes the effect of transfer pricing manipulation. 
If full repatriation is mandatory, b = 1 and global net income from Equation (7) becomes 
Π = (1 – t1)(π1 + π2). 
                                                          
23
 In Equation (2), both exogenous probability φi and tax penalty zi entail the same impact within the 
expected tax penalty costs. 
24
 When n-degree polynomial derives two results (e.g. when r is uneven), the solution is one consistent with 
the direction (sign) of income shifting for either HTP or LTP case. 
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Appendix C: Effect of repatriation under limited tax credit rule 
 
MNE aims to maximize global profits, but faces legal limitation t1bπ2 ≥ t2qπ2. For 
global net income in Equation (9), the Lagrangian of objective function is 
 
1 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2( , , , ) (1 ) (1 ) ( )i iL p b q t t t b t q z m t b t qλ π π π π αϕ λ π π= − + − − + − + −  
 
The first order conditions are25 
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and the Kuhn-Tucker condition is λ(t1b – t2q)m = 0, where t1bm ≥ t2qm, λ ≥ 0. Lp gives 
rise to Equation (10) restricted by t1bm ≥ t2qm, and both Lb and Lq imply λ = π2 (we get λ 
> 0). Therefore, Kuhn-Tucker condition is satisfied when t1bm = t2qm and MNE 
maximizes global net income if b = q(t2/t1). The restriction on tax credit causes q vary 
according to variance of b. 
For HTP case, the tax credit constraint is slack at the solution because it entails q 
< b, and MNE is able to completely offset foreign taxation in home country, even if full 
repatriation is mandatory. Global net income from Equation (9) becomes Π = (1 – t1)π1 + 
(1 – t2)π2 for any b = q(t2/t1), which is the same outcome for HTP case as in proportional 
tax credit rule. For LTP case, however, b > t2/t1 generates additional taxation of π2 in 
Country 1, i.e. for the upper threshold q = 1, t2 < t1 implies b < 1, and b still has room to 
increase. MNE achieves the optimal level of transfer pricing manipulation if there is 
chance to choose b ≤ t2/t1, allowing MNE to equate taxation of π2 in both countries. Full 
repatriation produces Π = (1 – t1)(π1 + π2), as in proportional tax credit rule. 
Further, we obtain the optimal level of transfer pricing manipulation, with effect 
of tax restriction, by solving Lp for p – p; assume the Lagrangian p – p = M(b,q,λ). Thus, 
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and the Kuhn-Tucker condition is λ(t1b – t2q) = 0, where t1b ≥ t2q, λ ≥ 0. Mb and Mq derive 
λ = (pc – p)2/2φizi, so λ > 0. We arrive at the same solution b = q(t2/t1). 
 
                                                          
25
 Assume r = 2 in this Appendix. 
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Appendix D: Effect of repatriation under foreign tax deduction rule 
 
Differentiating Equation (12) with respect to b provides 
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We obtain a distinct “tax differential” term t1(1 – t2), which makes (p – p)b > 0 
regardless the tax rates of each country26; see that t1(1 – t2) is positive for all t1 > 0, t2 < 1 
cases27. In closer analysis28, optimal transfer price in Equation (12) implies pb > 0, hence 
repatriation rate b makes p – p to escalate in the direction of a HTP and produces different 
effects for t2 > t1 and t2 < t1. For t2 > t1, increase in b causes an increase in the optimal 
level of transfer pricing manipulation (decrease in b causes the opposite). For t2 < t1, 
otherwise, income shifting incentive is canceled when condition 
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is satisfied29, and the switch-over spot from LTP to HTP case is t2 = t1[(1 – b)/(1 – t1b)], 
rather than t2 = t1. From Equation (11) we derive Πb = – t1(π2 – t2π2), which is negative 
for all t2 < 1, and maximization of Π occurs when b = 0. 
 
Appendix E: Analysis of the impact of ad valorem tariff on imports 
 
MNE’s functions of global net income and the objective function ϕ = Π – E(Zi) 
remain the same as those in previous analysis, but now the profit of subsidiary is π2 = 
R2(s2) – C2(s2 – m) – p(1 + τ)m. 
First, when home country applies source principle on taxation of foreign profits, 
optimal level of transfer pricing manipulation is30 
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Circumstances for HTP and LTP modify, following the increase of taxation in 
Country 2: MNE chooses HTP if relative tax differential (t2 – t1)/(1 – t2) is higher than 
tariff τ; otherwise, LTP is chosen. 
For the proportional tax credit rule, we identify that t2 > t1 infers Π = (1 – t1)π1 + 
(1 – t2)π2, so maximization condition is the same as for source-based taxation. For t2 < t1, 
optimal p – p is 
 
                                                          
26
 This term exhibits the recursive attribute t1(1 – t2) = (1 – t2)[1 – (1 – t1)]. 
27
 t1 > 0 denotes the existence of income taxation in home country, and t2 < 1 denotes that income tax rate 
in Country 2 is less than 100%. This interior case is the prevailing reality for firms and is taken for the 
analysis of this Appendix. 
28
 Calling up that p is independent, we obtain (p – p)b = pb > 0. 
29
 This condition is inconsistent for t2 > t1 because it produces b < 0. 
30
 Assume r = 2 in this Appendix. 
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Comparing it with Equation (8), it shows that repatriation of foreign profits 
generates a distinct effect than one stated in Proposition 1. Differentiating with respect to 
b provides 
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which is different from optimal manipulation under source-based taxation. Repercussion 
of repatriation rate b is weakened in scale τ(1 – t1), because τ reduces net profits of 
subsidiary, so home taxation of foreign profits is also reduced. Maximization occurs when 
b = 0. 
For the limited tax credit rule, inequality constraint t1bπ2 ≥ t2qπ2 remains. 
Lagrangian function takes the same setup as before, so the maximizing conditions are 
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and the Kuhn-Tucker condition is λ(t1b – t2q)(1 + τ)m = 0, where t1b(1 + τ)m ≥ t2q(1 + 
τ)m, λ ≥ 0. Lp derives optimal p – p, while both Lb and Lq give λ = π2 (so, λ > 0). Thus, 
maximization occurs when b = q(t2/t1); this is the same result we obtain for Proposition 
2, and it derives Corollary 1 as well31. 
When home country adopts the foreign tax deduction rule, optimal level of 
transfer pricing manipulation is 
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and its derivative with respect to b provides 
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We have (p – p)b > 0 for all t1 > 0, t2 < 1; the same conclusion as one analysis of 
Equation (12). This time, however, a sufficiently high τ can cause optimal p – p to be 
negative, even for t2 > t1. Income shifting incentive is neutralized when 
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31
 (p – p)b gives the same result. 
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regardless which income tax rate is the highest. Therefore, condition in Corollary 2 is 
modified for τ > 0, and it becomes applicable for both HTP and LTP cases. MNE 
maximizes global net income when is able to set b = 0. 
